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ABSTRACT: One of the prescriptions of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is to organise water 
resources management on a watershed or basin scale, which usually involves the establishment of special-purpose 
organisations. This paper contributes to the discussion on the functioning of these organisations and, more 
specifically, on the relationship between their institutional design and their performance. An in-depth case study of 
the Urmia Lake Restoration National Committee (ULRNC) in Iran reveals that the committee has been successful in 
drafting ambitious plans and policies for restoring Urmia Lake. However, there is a serious risk of implementation 
failure due to contradictory national policy agendas of lake restoration and agricultural development, insufficient 
budget allocation for realising the restoration plan, lack of provincial accountability for the spending of resources 
made available for the implementation of restoration measures, and potential future political instability which may 
lead to less attention to the restoration process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, there has been a discursive shift in water management from the 
engineering paradigm or hydraulic mission towards Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). 
IWRM deals with technical as well as social, economic and institutional aspects of water management 
(Biswas, 2004). IWRM provides a holistic framework for ensuring that water resources are developed, 
managed and us d in an equitable, sustainable and efficient manner (UN-Water, 2018). IWRM can be 
considered to be a response to several sources of fragmentation of water governance systems. Lubell 
and Edelenbos (2013) argue that this fragmentation cannot be completely 'solved', and that the main 
goal of IWRM is to facilitate coordination, cooperation, joint responsibility and integration within 
fragmented governance systems (Teisman and Edelenbos, 2011). 
IWRM suggests that the watershed is the appropriate scale for organising water resource 
management. The concept of watersheds was developed as a technical tool – an area of land draining 
into a common body of water – but has been taken up as a policy framework (Cohen and Davidson, 2011). 
Watersheds are also "regions to which political jurisdictions almost never correspond, and watershed-
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scale decision-making structures do not usually exist" (Schlager and Blomquist, 2008 : 1). Managing water 
at the watershed level helps to manage and control the conflicts between upstream and downstream 
water users and also encourages practitioners to develop a comprehensive approach to environmental 
problems instead of sticking to their local interests and traditional boundaries (Imperial, 2005). There is, 
however, no universal formula for organising watershed management (Biswas, 2004). 
River basin organisations (RBOs) have emerged and are supposed to deal effectively with the 
challenge of managing water at the watershed level. The establishing or restructuring of RBOs is part of 
almost every contemporary water sector reform programme, and RBOs are incorporated into nearly all 
new water legislation that has been produced over the past ten years (Jaspers and Gupta, 2014). There 
are many different types of RBOs, and the current literature on water governance has produced various 
typologies of this kind of organisation (see, for example, Alaerts (1999), Hooper (2005), Molle et al., 
(2007) and Huitema and Meijerink (2014)). 
In this paper, we want to learn from the institutional design and performance of one specific 
organisation for watershed management, the Urmia Lake Restoration National Committee (ULRNC), 
which was established in 2013 following the steady drying up of Urmia Lake and political changes in Iran 
after presidential elections (ULRP, 2015b). We will use the framework inspired by Ostrom and developed 
by Huitema and Meijerink (2014), to characterise the design of this committee, to discuss its 
performance, and to explore the relationship between its design and performance. 
This paper uses a case study strategy. Case studies enable researchers to closely examine the data 
within a specific context, and to explore and understand complex issues such as the design and 
performance of RBOs (Zainal, 2007). For our in-depth case study, we have used four data sources and 
methods: 
1. Literature review and secondary analysis: We analysed what others have written about 
institutions for water resources management in Iran and for Urmia Lake. 
2. Analysis of legislation and policy documents to identify specific rules that characterise the 
institutions: We analysed official reports, policy documents, laws, acts and governmental 
websites. 
3. Participatory observations: Through their positions, respectively, as former member of the expert 
groups during the ULRNC establishment, and member of the Monitoring and Evolution Council 
of the Urmia Lake Restoration Program (ULRP), two of the authors made observations during 
meetings in which the ULRP was discussed. 
4. Interviews with key actors: We conducted interviews with the head of the ULRNC, with a staff 
member of the executive division of ULRP, with a member of the Monitoring and Evaluation 
Council of the ULRP, and with a staff member of the regional office of the Ministry of Energy. 
In the following section, we first discuss the theoretical framework of the institutional design and 
performance of RBOs, after which we briefly sketch the history of the Urmia Lake Restoration National 
Committee and characterise its institutional design. Thereafter, we discuss the committee’s performance 
and the relationship between the its institutional design and its performance. Finally, we present the 
main findings and conclusions, and reflect on the theory of the relationship between institutional design 
and performance of RBOs. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE OF WATERSHED ORGANISATIONS 
The term 'institution' refers to many different types of entities and, conceptually, to the frequently 
invisible elements of the policy environment (Verkerk et al., 2006). Institutions may be defined as 
"systems of rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that give rise to social practices, assign 
roles to the participants in these practices and, guide interactions among the occupants of the relevant 
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roles" (Gupta et al., 2010 : 460). North (1990) defines institutions as the "rules of the game in society". 
This includes rules, habits, and customs that define patterns of behaviour and shape human interaction. 
The rules and roles may be formally described in the form of a law, policy, or procedure; they may also 
emerge informally as norms, standard operating practices, or habits that may be visible or hidden 
(Huitema and Meijerink, 2017). 
Ostrom has developed a framework for Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD). The IAD is a 
"multi-level conceptual map" which may be used to analyse the design and performance of institutions 
regulating interactions within an action arena (Polski and Ostrom, 1999). The IAD uses seven types of 
rules for analysing an action arena. 
Huitema and Meijerink (2014) used Ostrom’s framework in their study of the development, design, 
and performance of river basin organisations. They merged some of these rules and produced a list of 
five types: authority rules, aggregation rules, boundary rules, information rules and pay-off rules (Table 
1). 
Table 1. Rule types (Huitema and Meijerink, 2014). 
Rule Description 
Authority rules Rules specifying the set of positions, and defining the scope of each position’s 
authority 
Aggregation 
rules 
Rules defining how decisions are made – weighing individual choices to calculate 
collective choices and decisions 
Boundary rules Rules defining who is eligible to enter a position and who is excluded, taking into 
consideration the geographical boundaries of the jurisdiction; this rule also affects 
the number of participants 
Information 
rules 
Rules affecting the amount and type of information available to participants, and 
establishing channels of information flow among the participants  
Pay-off rules Rules determining how costs and benefits are meted out, and assigning external 
rewards or sanctions to particular actions 
They also used these rules to define four ideal types of RBOs: autonomous, agency, coordinating, and 
partnership (Table 2). 
Table 2. RBO ideal types (Huitema and Meijerink, 2014: 38). 
Typology Description 
Autonomous Those having a constitutionally guaranteed independent position, and having 
their own mechanisms for democratic control 
Agency Those created by the state/government to perform a limited number of 
specialised tasks at arm’s-length from the government; accountable only to 
(parts of) government 
Coordinating Those created to coordinate activities of different governmental organisations, 
and with accountability to these organisations 
Partnership Bottom-up initiated governance arrangements which are accountable to their 
participants, including civil society organisations 
Huitema and Meijerink (2014) have studied the institutional designs of 11 different RBOs with this 
framework and found that most have properties of more than one ideal type, and that in some cases 
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there is more than one RBO within a river basin, often a combination of an agency and a coordinating 
type of RBO. Huitema and Meijerink (ibid) also evaluated the performance of each RBO. They questioned 
whether the RBO enhances 1) coordination across levels of government and policy sectors, and between 
public and private parties; 2) the accountability of water policies; 3) the legitimacy of water policies; and 
4) the environmental effectiveness of policies. Finally, they have discussed the relationship between the 
institutional design and performance of each RBO. They found four common patterns that suggest 
connections between RBOs’ design and performance: 1) institutional interplay, which refers to the 
coordination between the RBO and other organisations relevant to water resources management within 
a basin; 2) the ability to generate sufficient resources; 3) the tension between centralisation and 
decentralisation, which refers to advantages and disadvantages of (de)centralisation; and 4) the time 
which RBOs need in order to become effective and yield results (Huitema and Meijerink, 2014). 
In this paper, we use this framework to study the design and performance of the Urmia Lake 
Restoration National Committee, and to explore whether the patterns found in other basins also apply 
to Urmia Lake. 
THE HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF THE URMIA LAKE RESTORATION NATIONAL COMMITTEE 
From the beginning of the 21st century, watershed management in Iran has undergone several changes 
(Nikravesh et al., 2009), mainly some fundamental organisational reforms in water management which 
provided fertile ground for the implementation of IWRM. Changes have occurred at policy levels as well 
as in strategies and structure. "Fundamental Policies of Iran" emphasised the need to implement 
integrated water resource management programmes that address the entire water cycle and are based 
on sustainable development principles at the basin scale (EDC, 2006). At the strategy level, "Long-
Term Development Strategies for Iran’s Water Resources", approved by the government in 2002 
(IWRMC, 2002), became a guide for compiling short-term and mid-term plans, and also aimed to address 
the nexus between the water sector and other sectors, such as environment, agriculture and industry. At 
the organisational-structure level, water resource management has changed in order to create a more 
comprehensive management structure. In 2002, the government established the Iran Water Resources 
Management Company as an agency of the Ministry of Energy, and put it in charge of all regional water 
companies. This larger company was given the responsibility for both planning and implementing water 
programmes, and had a hierarchical structure with three main levels: 1) national, headed by the Ministry 
of Energy; 2) river basin, managed by three Tehran offices of the Iran Water Resources Management 
Company which helped the company to develop its plan at the basin scale; and 3) the provincial level, 
headed by the 30 regional (provincial) water companies which are part of the Holding Company of Iran 
Water Resource Management, and which implement the plans (Nikravesh et al., 2009). During the 2009 
to 2013 administrative reforms, water management responsibilities were transferred to the provincial 
level, which caused conflicts between the provinces over transboundary water systems including the 
Urmia Basin (Madani, 2014). The central basin-scale management located in Tehran produces plans, but 
these have a poor chance of being implemented whenever collaboration and coordination at the basin 
scale are required, because of conflicts between the provinces. 
Urmia Lake is the largest hypersaline lake in the Middle East (Alizadeh-Choobari et al., 2016; Nouri et 
al., 2017; Shadkam et al., 2016), and is located in the northwest of Iran between East and West Azerbaijan 
and Kurdistan provinces. The lake was designated as a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve site in 1976, with 
consideration for its unique ecological value (Eimanifar and Mohebbi, 2007). Urmia Lake is formed at the 
lowest point inside the closed Urmia Basin (Zarghami, 2011). 
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Figure 1. Urmia Lake Basin, existing dams and the lake’s surface area (Zarghami and AmirRahmani, 2017). 
 
There are 17 permanent rivers, 12 seasonal rivers, and 39 floodways in Urmia Basin. Most of the surface 
water is situated in the western part of the basin; Simineh-roud and Zarineh-roud alone provide 41.6 
percent of total surface water inflow into the lake. The basin is one of the valuable centres of agricultural 
and livestock activity in Iran. According to statistical reports by the Ministry of Energy, the potential of 
renewable water resources in Urmia Lake Basin is 7024 Mm3. The total water consumption by different 
sectors is 4825 Mm3, which is equivalent to 70 percent of renewable water resources. Table 3 shows the 
status of water consumption in the basin; as can be seen, nearly 90 percent of water is used by the 
agricultural sector. Some 57 percent of the water consumed is surface water, and the rest is groundwater. 
There are about 74 dams and more than 88,000 wells in the basin which are using groundwater legally 
or illegally (ULRP, 2014a). 
Table 3. Annual water consumption in the Urmia Basin (Mm3) (ULRP, 2014a). 
 Agriculture Industry Domestic Total 
Surface water 2424 33 276 2733 
Groundwater 1867 35 190 2092 
Total  4291 68 466 4825 
Over the past few decades, Urmia Lake has experienced a rapid decline in water level. Figure 2 shows the 
water level of Urmia Lake from 1965 to 2017 (Salimi and Maknoon, 2018). Water level peaked at 1278.39 
metres in 1995 (AghaKouchak et al., 2015), but since then there has been a marked decrease (reaching 
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four metres lower than the ecological level in 2015). The Department of Environment has determined 
1274.1 m as the ecological level for the lake, and has proved that when water levels are lower than this 
threshold, salinity increases to an extent that ecological functions inside the lake are severely at risk (DOE, 
2015). 
Previous studies have shown that the situation in Urmia Lake is caused not only by natural factors (for 
instance an 18 percent reduction in precipitation and a 1.5-degree increase in temperature in the last 
two decades), but also by human activities and mismanagement, such as construction of dams, diversion 
of upstream rivers, extraction of groundwater, and agricultural development (ULRP, 2015e). Stakeholders 
blame each other for contributing to the shrinkage of the lake, with the most significant conflict being 
between the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Agriculture. According to the Ministry of Energy, 
about 90 percent of the basin’s water is consumed by the agricultural sector. On the other hand, the 
Ministry of Agriculture blames the Ministry of Energy for its inability to calculate the water supplied to 
farmers, and argues that the lake shrinkage should primarily be attributed to the construction of dams 
(Rafiei, 2014). 
Figure 2. Mean annual water level at Urmia Lake (Zarghami et al., 2017). 
 
To stop the decline in water levels, Iran’s ninth and tenth governments (2005-2013) took some actions, 
the most important being the drafting of the Urmia Lake Comprehensive Management Plan, which was 
prepared by the Iranian Department of the Environment in cooperation with different government 
agencies at the national level, and provincial authorities within the basin. The plan was signed on 18 
October 2008 by the Vice President, the head of the Directorate of the Department of Environment, the 
Ministers of Energy and Agriculture, and the provincial governors of West and East Azerbaijan and 
Kurdistan. The plan took the form of an agreement consisting of six articles and six notes, and had a five-
year validity. Eighteen months later, on 4 April 2010, it was ratified and approved by the Cabinet of 
Ministers. An executive committee was subsequently formed, and 24 projects were selected for 
implementation during the period of the five-year plan. Many of these projects had not been 
implemented by the end of the tenth government (2009-2013) due to insufficient budget allocation 
(ULRP, 2015c). 
During these years Urmia Lake experienced a severe drought which caused serious environmental 
problems such as dust storms (Garousi et al., 2013), and led to public complaints. For instance, the 16 
August 2011 Iranian parliament vote against allocating funds to the Lake Urmia Rescue Plan led to angry 
demonstrations in Tabriz and Urmia city on 27 August, and again on 3 September 2011. Large numbers 
of people came out to protest the official lack of attention to the drying up of Urmia Lake (France24, 
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2011). This may explain why, in their speeches during Iran’s eleventh government election in 2013, many 
politicians stressed the importance of rescuing Urmia Lake. Building a government that takes the 
principles of environmental sustainability to heart was one of the most important points of Dr Rouhani’s 
election platform, who then went on to be elected president. He constituted the Urmia Lake Rescue Task 
Force at the first meeting of his cabinet on 18 August 2013. The Ministry of Energy was given 
responsibility for setting up this task force and for organising meetings with experts from different fields 
of expertise. 
During the task force meetings, it became apparent that experts had diverging views on the feasibility 
of Urmia Lake restoration. Some experts argued that restoration of the lake by increasing the water flow 
into it would be nearly impossible, as the lake’s water is connected to the groundwater system and this 
groundwater is extracted for various economic purposes. These experts therefore suggested draining the 
lake and turning it into a natural park (Kardovani, 2012). Another group of experts felt that a partial – 
instead of a full – restoration should be pursued, as the full restoration would be impossible due to lack 
of water in the basin. They proposed restoring only the main part of the lake and some regional wetlands 
(Agh, 2014). A third group of experts believed that the lake could be sustainably and fully restored if 
interbasin water transfer systems were put in place to compensate for the basin’s water shortage (ULRP, 
2014b). Their proposal was to transfer water to Urmia Lake from the Caspian Sea and the Aras River. 
Finally, another group of experts believed that the lake could be sustainably and fully restored if dam 
construction was stopped, existing reservoirs better managed, and agricultural water use regulated. 
These measures would increase the lake’s inflow, limit additional surface water and groundwater 
withdrawal, and mitigate salt blowouts and sand storms (ULRP, 2014b). 
Despite these differences of opinion, the experts tried to reach a consensus on what needed to be 
done to save the lake. In the special meeting, "Thinking Together about the Urmia Lake Restoration 
Process", which was held at the University of Tehran on 26 September 2013, 26 projects were selected 
and given high priority. These projects were ratified at the Urmia Lake Rescue Task Force meeting on 8 
October 2013, but conflicts arose among different stakeholders as some experts claimed that 'the system' 
(the Ministry of Energy) which had caused the crisis by constructing dams, should not be put in charge of 
resolving the problem. Because of this conflict, the Iranian government decided to accelerate the process 
of restoring Urmia Lake by establishing a new national committee under the chairmanship of the 
President or his special representative. 
At the meeting of 22 January 2014, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the establishment of the ULRNC 
under the chairmanship of the First Vice President. Following this resolution, the ULRNC secretariat 
officially began its activities and started preparing the Urmia Lake Restoration Program, (ULRP, 2015c). 
Figure 3 shows the organisational chart of the ULRNC. 
ULRP started its activities by establishing a Planning and Resource Mobilisation Unit (PRMU) at Sharif 
University of Technology, in collaboration with Tabriz University, Urmia University, and national and 
international experts. The ULRP set up six technical committees and 20 working groups, and conducted 
surveys on similar lakes around the world. They set up a vision and developed a Roadmap to return the 
Urmia Lake’s water level to its ecological state of 1274.1 m by 2023. 
The Roadmap consisted of three phases: 
• Stabilisation phase (2014-16): to stop the decline in the lake’s water levels and to reduce the 
possible negative effects of a dried up Urmia Lake 
• Restoring phase (2017-22): to increase the water level by implementing solutions which bring 
water to the lake body 
• Final restoration phase (2023): to stabilise the restored water level 
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Figure 3. ULRNC’s organisational chart (ULRP, 2015b). 
 
Figure 4. Restoration Roadmap (ULRP, 2014b). 
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to reduce water consumption in the agricultural sector by increasing water efficiency. Some of the 
measures of this package are: allocating funds to supply-required technologies; direct purchasing of 
water from farmers (nakasht); deficit irrigation for wheat and barley; replacing barley with alfalfa; 
applying sprinkler and drip irrigation; and using greenhouse cultivation for vegetables. While the ULRP 
expected this measure to add 1430 Mm3/y to the lake inflow, the actual quantitative impact is unclear 
(Shadkam, 2017). 
The second package is "Water Supply From New Resources", which tries to increase the lake inflow 
by interbasin water transfer from Zab Basin and Silveh Dam, as well as from new sources like treated 
wastewater. 
The third package includes "Studies and Software Measures", and aims at the development and 
implementation of a comprehensive training programme, capacity building, and public and local 
community participation, in order to raise awareness of the critical condition of the lake and the necessity 
of restoring it. This package is expected to play a vital role in the success of the two other packages. 
The fourth package includes "Initiatives on Protection and Mitigation of Negative Impacts". It focuses 
on the identification of dust sources and ways to stabilise them, and on the reduction of the negative 
ecological impacts of the lake’s shrinkage. One important project in this package is the development of 
alternative employment for farmers and livelihood improvement of local people. 
The fifth package is the "Control and Reduction of the Withdrawal of Surface and Groundwater 
Resources in the Urmia Lake Basin". This package is aimed at preventing new projects and illegal water 
usage by forbidding new dam0F1 construction, new irrigation and water supply networks, and new water 
allocations to the agricultural sector, and reinforcing protective laws. 
The sixth and last package is "Facilitating and Increasing the Water Volume Entering the Lake Through 
Structural Measures". This package is aimed at increasing the amount of water that feeds the lake 
through dredging of rivers and waterways. 
Figure 5. Six main objectives of the 26 solutions in the restoration plan. 
 
The Roadmap was discussed and approved in two meetings of the ULRNC, of which the first meeting was 
chaired by the First Vice President, and the second (on 29 June 2014) by President Dr Rouhani. It was 
                                                          
1 Except Cheraghveis and Shahid Madani dams. 
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expected that the main objective of restoring the natural water level in the lake could be achieved 
between 2014 and 2023. 
Identifying the rules 
In this section, we make an institutional analysis of the ULRNC using the five rule types and the typology 
of RBOs presented in Section Two. 
Authority rules 
After the Islamic Revolution, one of the vital national acts on water policy in Iran was the Law on the 
Equitable Distribution of Water.2 According to this law, the government, and more specifically the 
Ministry of Energy, has the competencies to manage the supply and demand of water and wastewater 
services, to set the water price for all types of consumption, and to recover costs from all water users 
(Iran, 1982). The main authority in the management of water is therefore the Ministry of Energy. 
The establishment of the ULRNC as a body that presides over the existing water management 
structure changed the authority rules in the Urmia Basin. The ULRNC follows the Urmia Lake Restoration 
Roadmap, and within the scope of this Roadmap it has the authority to manage other stakeholders. It 
was decided that the projects included in the Restoration Roadmap would be implemented by the related 
institutions and organisations, while the ULRNC would only carry out monitoring and evaluation (ULRP, 
2015c). The ULRNC was hence established as an umbrella organisation to coordinate, facilitate, monitor 
and evaluate the Urmia Lake Restoration Program. The Ministry of Energy, as one of the members of the 
ULRNC, was tasked with following and implementing all plans approved by the committee. However, in 
reality, the Ministry of Energy mostly prioritises water supply for domestic, industrial and agricultural 
uses, over ecosystem restoration. 
With the formation of the ULRNC, the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders have changed in 
varying degrees. In a study conducted by the Social Committee of the ULRP, 80 stakeholders were 
identified and classified according to the restoration plans. The results showed that among the top 20 
key stakeholders, only villagers and farmers were not governmental (ULRP, 2015a). 
The study also considers eight key roles for stakeholders, including leadership and policymaking, 
implementing the projects, monitoring and evaluating the projects, participation in plans, empowerment 
and training of local people, increasing awareness, capacity building, and impact assessment. The 
Ministries of Energy and Agriculture, the Department of Environment, regional water companies, and 
provincial governors play the most important roles in the restoration plans. Non-governmental groups, 
local women’s associations, water-user associations and social activists are considered to have less 
influence on restoration plans. To summarise, the authority remains in the hands of governmental actors, 
primarily the Ministry of Energy. 
Aggregation rules 
Despite this hierarchical structure, the ULRNC relies on consensus decision-making and planning. 
According to the framework defined by the committee, it has been decided that any decision must be 
prepared and discussed within groups of experts, and a final decision must be made by them rather than 
by individuals (ULRP, 2015b). To do so, three decision-making and professional committees – steering, 
technical, and coordinating – were established (Figure 3). To be more specific, there is an expert-based 
process for decision-making. First, subcommittees identify real challenges on the ground and hold 
meetings to analyse them and find possible solutions. In the next step, alternative solutions are reported 
                                                          
2 This law was approved by parliament in 1982, and later some modifications were made. The law consists of five chapters, 52 
articles, and 27 notes. This law regulates public and national ownership of water, groundwater resources, surface water 
resources, duties and authorities, and penalties. 
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to the planning and mobilisation committee unit which prioritises solutions. Lastly, the final decision is 
made by consensus in the ULRNC (ULRP, 2015b). NGOs and the private sector have a small role in planning 
and decision-making. 
Although decisions are made in groups and are based on formal information and science, we learned 
from interviews that other factors, such as lobbies, political debates, and public complaints affect the 
decision-making process as well, and often decisions are interest based. For example, the livelihood 
problems of local farmers in turn cause social discontent and have become a national security issue (ISNA, 
2018). This has been instrumental in justifying some actions taken by the Ministries of Energy and 
Agriculture, and has triggered members of parliament to put pressure on the ULRP. For instance, the 
Ministry of Energy refuses to release water from the dam reservoirs for lake restoration because they 
give priority to farmers’ needs. The Ministry of Agriculture attributes the poor improvement of 
productivity and the inability to control the increase in cultivated land to the economic and livelihood 
problems of farmers, and considers the confrontation with local farmers to be a security issue. Members 
of parliament also put pressure on the ULRP to finance projects which may actually increase water 
consumption by farmers. These examples illustrate the severe tension between the ambition to restore 
Lake Urmia and policies to increase agricultural production. 
Boundary rules 
Boundary rules can be analysed from two different points of view. One describes the geographical 
delineation of the RBO and the other refers to the inclusiveness of the decision-making process. 
Geographically, there is a clear definition of Iran’s water basin boundaries which is accepted by 
experts and stakeholders. Iran has six main basins and 30 sub-basins (Nikravesh et al., 2009). There was 
no controversy over the definition of the boundary of Urmia Basin during the establishment of the 
ULRNC. Ghaheri et al. (1999), who reviewed the physical characteristics of the Urmia Basin, noted that 
the total basin area was about 51,440 km2, that it contained 21 permanent and seasonal rivers and 39 
episodic ones which flow into Urmia Lake, and that there are no surface outflows from the lake. As the 
lake is supplied by these rivers, the ULRNC chose the basin level for its territory. 
As mentioned earlier, all major government bodies concerned, including provinces, are members of 
ULRNC under the chairmanship of the First Vice President (ULRP, 2015b). Although non-governmental 
actors are not formal members of the ULRNC, some universities, international collaborators, and experts 
from NGOs became involved in the ULRP through collaborations with governmental bodies. Interestingly, 
the private sector has a minimal role, local farmers have just two farmer-based associations, and the 
most prominent member is Farmers’ House. Local people who live near cities and villages have no 
representatives except local governors and local ministerial bodies. The long distance between the Urmia 
Basin and the central management structures, which are headed by the ULRP office in Tehran, prevents 
local experts from fully participating in decision-making processes. Some local experts have expressed 
their dissatisfaction and suggested to transfer the central office of the ULRP to one of the provinces in 
the Urmia Basin. However, the ULRP believes that there is insufficient administrative capacity available 
in the region, and that there are more water experts residing in Tehran than in the provinces (Aghaei, 
2018). 
Information rules 
The ULRNC is authorised to conduct the research and to collect the data which are needed to overcome 
the Urmia Lake shrinkage problem. During the period of the establishment of the ULRNC and the 
development of the Restoration Roadmap, several studies have been carried out to gather data for 
decision-making. Moreover, six main expert committees and 20 working groups have been established 
to analyse the data and to reach a consensus on major decisions. In these teams and committees, 
technical and engineering sciences like water and soil engineering and environmental sciences are very 
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well represented. There has been some social science input on how to raise awareness and organise 
participation by local communities (ULRP, 2015d), but economic expertise was limited to estimating the 
cost of plans. 
The ULRNC also needs information to monitor and evaluate projects. To do so, the ULRP head office 
and two provincial sub-offices were established. The ULRP head office employs personnel from its 
provincial offices and regional universities for monitoring the projects. Provincial offices are responsible 
for collecting information on the projects’ progress, surveying and monitoring the implementation of 
ULRP agreements with other organisations, and supervising the implementation of social projects. 
Universities are tasked with evaluating the effectiveness of projects, verifying performance reports by 
executive agencies (through field surveys), and identifying and analysing the sources of implementation 
problems. The evaluation results are summarised and integrated through the ULRP Planning and 
Resource Mobilisation Unit, and form the basis for prioritising the subsequent projects and resource 
allocations (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6. ULRP monitoring process. 
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In practice, there are problems in the M&E process. Real and updated data is at the disposal of executive 
organisations, such as the Ministries of Energy and Agriculture, but they prevent online sharing of this 
data with the ULRP. For example, all data about water resources and water consumption is collected by 
the Ministry of Energy but is not made available online to the ULRP. Another problem is the absence of 
an independent reference for verification in case of conflict. As an example, when the ULRP reports poor 
performance of regional water companies to the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry asks its regional bodies 
to answer, and mostly they do not accept the ULRP’s claims. The General Inspection Organization of Iran 
(GIO), which is linked to the Judiciary of Iran, is responsible for solving this kind of conflict, but 
governmental organisations such as the ULRP and the Ministry of Energy prefer not to report intra-
government conflicts to the GIO. 
The ULRP website publishes important data about the lake’s current situation and also about the 
committee’s activities and the status of projects. Minutes of steering committee meetings have been 
published, and project progress is reported online just as are the results of completed studies, however 
there is no real-time online database shared with the public. 
Pay-off rules 
The expenses of the ULRNC are fully covered by government through the annual national budget, the 
National Development Fund of Iran (NDFI), and disaster management funds (ULRP, 2015c). Every year 
during the country’s annual budget approval, the ULRNC collects financial information from plan 
executors and then calculates the required budget to run the planned projects. After finalising the annual 
budget, the ULRNC sends a request to the Planning and Budget Organization and, after their analysis and 
if no changes are needed, the budget is sent to parliament to be approved as a budget law (ULRP, 2015c). 
According to the law, as the ULRNC is not an executive organisation it cannot be funded directly, so all 
payments are made through the Ministry of Energy. In this aspect of institutional design, the ULRNC is 
clearly an agency because it is funded by the government of Iran with no input from other stakeholders. 
Even though the ULRNC’s projects have a high priority at the national level, the funding which is needed 
for the implementation of the restoration plan is far more than actual allocations. From 2014 to 2017, 
the government allocated only 30 percent of the required budget (Table 4). 
Table 4. Urmia Lake restoration plans budgets and funding (Billion Rial). 
Year Planned budget Actual allocation  Percentage 
2014 7255 1840 25 
2015 11,203 2896 26 
2016 11,207 3000 27 
2017 8207 3639 44 
Total 37,872 11,375 30 
Due to the lack of funding, President Rouhani recently ordered that foreign funds could be used in Urmia 
Lake restoration projects. The ULRP then began negotiations with foreign countries such as Japan, in 
order to raise US$3 billion to fund acceleration of the lake’s revival (IRNA, 2018), but these negotiations 
were stopped due to the recent imposition of sanctions. About 100 members of parliament wrote a letter 
to Iran’s Supreme Leader asking for permission to use NDFI funds for the Urmia Lake Restoration Program 
(Tabnak, 2018). 
Pay-off rules also define who benefits and who loses. The law establishing the ULRNC forbids new 
development of agricultural land and water usage in the region. In this legal framework, the organisations 
and people involved in water development (e.g. dam constructors, interbasin water transfer 
constructors, and irrigation network developers) stand to lose their budget or contracts, while more 
funding will be received by governmental bodies that protect surface water, groundwater or the 
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environment, and by organisations which aim to improve water efficiency. Farmers who already have 
authorised water-shares get state subsidies to modernise their irrigation technologies, while those who 
don’t must stop using unauthorised water. Losers also include the farmers who can no longer get 
permission to expand their farms in the wake of the establishment of the ULRNC and the adoption of 
new restoration policies. Table 5 presents a summary of the rule types characterising the institutional 
design of the ULRNC. 
Table 5. Rule types characterising the ULRNC. 
Rule type ULRNC rules 
Authority rules ULRNC has the authority to plan and monitor the condition of Urmia Lake with 
regard to particular water issues such as water quantity and quality, surface and 
groundwater usage, and spatial planning; the Ministry of Energy is required to 
follow and implement these plans.  
Aggregation rules According to the initial framework defined by the committee, decisions must be 
prepared by experts according to a consensus protocol, with the Vice President 
taking the final decision in case of a conflict.  
Boundary rules There was no controversy over the boundary of Urmia Basin during the 
establishment of the ULRNC. All governmental water-related stakeholders are 
members of the ULRNC and the ULRP, as are international collaborators, 
representatives from universities, and specialists from a number of NGOs. 
Information rules The committee bases its decisions on the technical and engineering expertise of 
water, soil and environmental professionals. A committee that is responsible for 
socio-economic studies also includes some social science experts.  
Pay-off rules Government pays for all ULRNC costs including approved projects. The activities 
of the committee benefit those who want to protect water resources, while 
those who want to use more water lose funding.  
The ULRNC as agency and 'coordination' type of RBO 
According to the RBO typology presented earlier, the ULRNC is an agency: it is created by the government 
to perform a limited number of specialised tasks, is totally dependent on external funding and inputs, 
and is accountable only to (parts of) government. The ULRNC also has some characteristics of a 
'coordination' type of organisation as the committee was established primarily to improve the 
coordination between ministries and provinces. 
PERFORMANCE OF THE URMIA LAKE RESTORATION NATIONAL COMMITTEE 
In this section we evaluate the performance of the ULRNC. As only four years have passed since it was 
established, it is too early to draw final conclusions about its performance. Here we present a preliminary 
assessment and identify the main risks by using the evaluation criteria presented in Section Two. 
Coordination 
Urmia Lake was shrinking mainly because of a collective action problem. All stakeholders had been trying 
to maximise their short-term benefits without taking into account the long-term impacts of their 
behaviour. The ULRNC and the ULRP were established to respond to this serious problem by bringing all 
stakeholders together, arriving at collective decisions, and improving coordination. 
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In order to assess the degree of coordination achieved by the ULRNC, we distinguish between the 
development and the actual implementation of policies and plans. 
The ULRNC has made serious efforts to bring different experts and stakeholders together and to 
develop a common vision and long-term strategy to save Urmia Lake. At first glance, it seems that policy 
coordination has improved because all relevant governmental actors are involved in the development of 
joint visions and plans, and because the committee has managed to develop a strategy for restoration of 
the lake. However, a more detailed look into the decision-making process and contents of the plans 
reveals that coordination is still poor and problematic. Some of the main problems can be categorised as: 
• The existence of contradictory development policies and lack of proper land use plans: As the 
ULRNC does not play a main role in Iran’s economic development planning, some contradictory 
plans for the Urmia Basin have been approved which frustrate the restoration process. The ULRP 
tries to monitor these problems and to solve them by organising meetings and reporting on the 
observed problems to ministers, however this does not seem to be effective. For example, the 
development of agricultural land from 480,000 ha in 2012 to 560,000 ha in 2016 clearly 
contradicted the main objective of the Urmia Lake Restoration Program (ULRP, 2018b). Figure 6 
shows agriculture development upstream of the Hasanlu Dam in the Urmia Basin between 2014 
and 2017. This expansion of agricultural land is largely due to the construction of infrastructure 
by the Ministries of Energy and Agriculture and the allocation of water to farmers. In fact, these 
ministries continued with the Hasanlu Dam construction even after the establishment of the 
ULRNC and the adoption of the plan to restore Urmia Lake. 
Figure 7. Agriculture development upstream from the Hasanlu Dam in the Urmia Basin (ULRP, 2018b). 
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part of the new restoration plans. In the former, the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for ensuring 
food security in the country, one of the indices of which is the Ministry’s performance with regard to 
annual agricultural production. This Ministry of Agriculture programme is in conflict with the goal of 
preventing agricultural development and reducing water consumption in the Urmia Basin. The Ministry 
of Agriculture’s provincial subordinates, in an effort to meet the objectives of national development 
plans, continue to develop agriculture by implementing cultivation plans, turning dryland farming to 
irrigated farming, and turning natural into agricultural land. Although these contradictory policies still 
exist, the restoration plan has decreased the pace of cultivating new lands. 
• Weakness in integrating the plans: For developing the Restoration Roadmap, different technical 
working groups at different levels did preparatory work, until finally all proposed measures and 
projects were compiled. Due to time constraints, only redundancies were addressed and no 
integration of policies took place. 
Executives of the restoration plans are mostly within the regional branches of ministries. Each 
has its own goals and plans which are not well integrated with the ULRP’s programme, nor are 
regional offices aware of each other’s plans, making it hard to coordinate and align them. 
Another problem is that the Roadmap is rigid, with no flexibility for dealing with future 
uncertainties and no alternative scenarios. For example, the ULRNC planned to release a specific 
amount of water from the dams every winter. Although the Ministry of Energy is responsible for 
releasing this amount of water, in reality it adjusts releases to actual water availability resulting 
from differences in yearly rainfall, and takes into account stakeholders’ (including farmers’) 
interests, which is not in line with ULRP policies. Figure 8 shows the status of the dam reservoirs 
in the Urmia Basin. As can be seen, the reservoirs of all dams contain more water than the 
amount specified in the ULRP’s plans, meaning that some water which should have been released 
to restore the lake is stored in order to be distributed to farmers. 
Figure 8. The status of dam reserves in Urmia Basin (21 May 2018) (Tajrishi, 2018). 
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Implementation of plans is also slow and problematic. Some of the problems in coordination can be 
categorised as follows: 
• Weak administrative systems, big bureaucratic government: The existence of time-consuming 
bureaucracy and redundant rules makes the implementation process slow and coordination 
difficult. 
• Inconsistency in implementing plans: One of the restoration plans related to water consumption 
reduction in the agricultural sector was 'Nakasht' (not planting). According to this plan, 50,000 ha 
of agricultural land in the Zarrineh-roud area had to be leased by the government, which would 
then have to compensate the farmers (TabnakNews, 2014). The plan faced widespread opposition 
in the region and was ultimately stopped after pressure by members of parliament. The 
opponent’s argument was that there is no alternative income for farmers and so their livelihood 
is at risk (Khabaronline, 2017). 
• Lack of coordination between ministries and their regional agencies: Even if ministries have 
reached an agreement on policy and planning, conflicts may arise during implementation as 
regional agencies of the ministries defend their interests. As an example, there are more than 
40,000 illegal wells in the region (see Figure 9), and the Ministry of Energy was responsible for 
destroying these wells by 2017. 
Figure 9. All wells located in Urmia, the forbidden area (pink) and some in yellow are illegal (Shadkam, 
2017). 
 
The Ministry of Energy set a plan to reach this goal but the local implementation agencies were able to 
block less than 8 percent of the illegal wells. Table 7 shows the performance of regional water companies 
in the Urmia basin after 2013 in the line of objective No4 of the Lake restoration. They were able to save 
33.75 Mm3 but there is a big gap with between plans and implementation, and much public resistance. 
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Table 6. Performance of regional water companies in controlling illegal water usage in the Urmia Basin 
between 2013 and 2018 (ULRP, 2018a) 
Action Unit Performance 
Stopping new illegal well 
construction 
number 1051 
Preventing unauthorised 
drilling; seizing drilling machines 
number 491 
Blocking illegal wells number 3219 
Total water savings Mm3 33.75 
Environmental effectiveness 
After the implementation of the ULRNC’s plan, the decline in water level of the lake has stopped (see 
Figure 10). 
Figure 10. The trend of Urmia Lake’s water level (ULRP, 2018c). 
 
Although some experts believe that the rising water level can be explained by heavy precipitation in 2015-
2016 (Soudi et al., 2017) , Table 7 shows that the effect of the ULRP plans is undeniable when comparing 
the volume of water in the lake in the 2014-2015 water year with that of 2015-2016. Improvement of the 
lake’s water level has resulted from release of water from dams, reduction of water usage in the 
agriculture sector, dredging of rivers, and the construction of a canal connecting two of the main feeding 
rivers, leading to the conclusion that the projects that were part of the stabilisation phase of the ULRP 
have been rather successful (ULRP, 2018b). 
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Table 7. Comparison of the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 water years. 
Water year 2014-2015 2015-2016 ULRP Actions 
Precipitation 317 mm 326 mm  
The runoff recorded 
in hydrometric 
stations 
701 Mm3 2990 Mm3 1) Release of 440 Mm3 from dams 
2) 16 percent reduction in dam water use by 
agriculture 
3) Closing of streams in non-farming seasons 
'Fatalities'3 36% 15% 1) Dredging of 120 km of the rivers that feed 
into the lake 
2) Building of a 25 km channel connecting the 
Zarrineh-roud and the Simineh-roud Rivers 
Net inflow to 
Urmia Lake 480 Mm
3 1900 Mm3  
Although the decline in water level was stopped, the goals of the restoration plan have not yet been 
reached (see Figure 10). The report of the 58th meeting of the Monitoring and Evaluation Council 
examines the most important failures in the implementation of the plan. The report estimates that if 
there had been no agricultural development, an additional 210 Mm3 of water could have entered Urmia 
Lake in water year 2016-2017. Also, due to the failure of the planned water consumption reduction that 
was to follow from the agreement between the ULRP and the Ministry of Agriculture, about 420 Mm3 of 
water failed to be supplied to the lake. 
Furthermore, regarding the duties of the Ministry of Energy, about 178 Mm3 of surface water has been 
illegally taken; about 95 Mm3 of water has not reached the lake due to the non-realisation of the water 
transfer from the Silveh Dam through the Jeldian channel; and about 340 Mm3 has been distributed to 
farmland. Although outside the growing season the irrigation networks should be closed and the water 
should flow to the lake, in reality farmers continue to divert water to their land by opening or damaging 
the gates. The Ministry of Energy also has not operated the reservoirs according to the planned release 
of water from the dams. 
Following the stabilisation phase, some projects to reduce the negative environmental effects of lake 
shrinkage were implemented. These included actions for dust control, the planting of a halophyte such 
as Salicornia in semi-saline lands, waste water management, grazing management, and protection of 
animals and biodiversity. Figure 11 shows the progress between 2014 and 2016 in the reduction of land 
area with the potential for dust generation. 
In sum, there is evidence that some of the projects which have been implemented during the 
stabilisation phase have had positive effects, as have those which aimed to reduce the negative 
environmental effects of the lake’s shrinkage. Still, many environmental issues have not yet been solved. 
Accountability 
This section discusses accountability on three interrelated levels, including the ULRNC, the ULRP and the 
executive governmental bodies: 
                                                          
3 'Fatalities' refers to the water which does not reach the lake due to evaporation or infiltration into the soil. 
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Figure 11. The reduction of land areas that have the potential for dust generation in Urmia Basin (ULRP, 
2018c). 
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• The ULRNC, which is under the supervision of the Vice President and whose members are selected 
by the President,4 is indirectly accountable to the Iranian parliament. While the parliament does 
not have the right to ask a question directly to the ULRNC, the ministers involved or the President 
himself can be asked about their roles in ULRNC duties. There is also a legal framework in place 
for people’s representatives to ask questions in parliament about implementation of the ULRP. If 
25 percent of the members of parliament support a specific question, this question may be put to 
the President.5 This may explain why, in practice, the ULRNC is only held accountable to the 
President, and not to the Iranian parliament. 
• The ULRP, as a governmental body, must submit its financial statement to the General Inspection 
Office, which is linked to the judiciary system of Iran. The ULRP must also report on its 
performance to the Monitoring and Evalution Council, which evaluates the performance of the 
ULRP and reports the results to the ULRNC. 
• The governmental implementation agencies, which are responsible for the implementation of 
restoration plans, should be accountable to the ULRNC and ULRP. However, in practice, the ULRNC 
does not have the (legal) means to hold them accountable. The only thing the ULRNC can do is 
report implementation gaps to the responsible minister or to the First Vice President, though this 
has so far not been very effective. 
Legitimacy 
According to Scharpf (1999), legitimacy is defined as a two-dimensional concept, referring simultaneously 
to the inputs and the outputs of a political system. Input legitimacy revolves around the process by which 
members are selected, how decisions are made and power exercised, and so on. Output legitimacy 
focuses primarily on the public assessment of the relevance and quality of the institution’s performance. 
According to the authority and aggregation rules, citizens, NGOs, and the private sector have a small 
role in the process of decision-making by the ULRNC, but there are some projects to increase public 
participation, for example the Convention on Wetland’s (Ramsar Convention) programme on 
Communication, Education, Participation And Awareness (CEPA). To raise social awareness about the 
                                                          
4 There is no legal need for parliament to approve the ULRNC members. 
5 According to Iran's constitution, whenever at least one-fourth of the members of parliament pose a question to the President 
or any member of the assembly poses a question to a minister on a subject relating to their duties, the President or the minister 
is obliged to attend the assembly and answer the question. 
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negative effects of the lake’s shrinkage, the ULRNC has used social media, national and local TV shows 
and radio programmes, newspapers, and websites. In addition, many meetings and conferences have 
been organised with, for instance, local teachers, local experts, and agricultural organisations. 
Educational programmes for raising awareness have been set-up, such as those for educating women, 
students, farmers, and water-user associations (Abbaran cooperatives). Some NGOs have supported the 
creation of local institutions for seeking community rights. It should be noted that there are fewer than 
ten active environmental NGOs in Iran, of which two have focused on Urmia Lake. 
An element of the restoration programme which innovatively increases the input legitimacy of the 
ULRP (relative to other water plans in Iran), is the engagement of universities in planning, and the 
involvement of international experts. The ULRP, as the main executive body of restoration planning, is 
located at the Sharif University of Technology, and the two regional universities have been given 
responsibility for monitoring projects. The ULRP has also engaged in collaborations with more than 12 
countries and 20 international research institutes and universities. This approach has also to some extent 
enhanced the output legitimacy of restoration plans. 
Assessing output legitimacy is quite difficult because there is little data available for such assessments. 
We have learned from our interviews that ULRNC programmes typically have low output legitimacy 
because local farmers do not support the plans and policies drafted by the committee. The committee 
has been able to inform people about the threats and negative effects of lake shrinkage, but  unable to 
mobilise changes in water use behaviour because farmers did not feel they would benefit from this. They 
were not informed on economically and financially feasible alternatives, and do not believe that the 
Urmia Lake Restoration Program offers such alternatives (Paknia and Karamjavan, 2017). Farmers’ 
livelihood problems, in turn, cause social discontent and this has become a national security issue (ISNA, 
2018). This argument has also been used to justify the decisions of the Ministries of Energy and 
Agriculture, and has been used by MPs to put pressure on the ULRP. As mentioned earlier, the Ministry 
of Energy refused to release water to the lake to the detriment of farmers’ needs. The Ministry of 
Agriculture also attributed its poor performance in improving productivity and its inability to control the 
increase in cultivated land to the economic and livelihood problems of farmers, and considers the 
confrontation with local farmers to be a security issue. 
Performance analysis conclusion 
ULRNC is an agency which is trying to protect and restore Urmia Lake through coordinating existing 
institutions. It is a governmental body that is accountable directly to the President and some 
intergovernmental bodies, and indirectly accountable to the parliament. It has managed to slightly 
improve the coordination between different stakeholders at the planning and policy level, and has tried 
to facilitate implementation of the plans. ULRNC has acted in an environmentally effective manner 
through building a common vision to stop the drying up of the lake and related possible negative effects. 
However – and despite all efforts made by the ULRNC – there are still many implementation problems 
including contradictory development plans and improper budget allocation. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE 
Having discussed both the institutional design and the performance of the ULRNC, this section will discuss 
the relationship between the institutional design of the committee and its performance. As Huitema and 
Meijerink (2014) point out, this is a difficult question because there are many factors (not only 
institutional) influencing the performance of the committee. Nevertheless, some of the general patterns 
which they found across 11 watershed management organisations seem to be relevant here as well. 
The problem of institutional interplay: The ULRNC was established in addition to, and on top of, the 
current organisations working on water resources management in the basin. The ULRNC has managed to 
bring various governmental actors together and develop a more integrative and holistic perspective on 
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the lake’s problems. Although the establishment of the ULRNC as a basin committee created a good fit 
between the institution and the bioregion (the Urmia Basin), this spatial fit does not guarantee good 
performance. The committee’s performance largely depends on effective coordination with other 
organisations, such as the general governors of provinces, regional executive agencies of ministries, and 
the people living in the region. The main problem which the committee faces in its efforts to restore the 
lake is that these organisations usually defend vested interests. For example, regional water companies’ 
income depends on selling water and so a decrease in water consumption is detrimental to them. As 
explained above, the performance of the regional implementation agency of the Ministry of Agriculture 
depends on agricultural production, which is not favoured by a decrease in water consumption. Finally, 
the significantly cheaper prices of water have not provided local farmers incentives to increase 
production efficiency. Despite the committee’s efforts, 'old' water policies, characterised by a top-down 
style and a focus on the realisation of infrastructure works and agricultural development, are still highly 
influential (Nabavi, 2018). 
Resources: In most cases, Huitema and Meijerink (2014) found that the watershed committee has a 
small amount of resources for a secretariat and for joint planning activities, but lacks sufficient resources 
for the implementation of its plans. In the case of ULRNC, due to the high political commitment a large 
budget was allocated on paper for the implementation of the plans. The actual budget allocation, 
however, was only 30 percent of the ULRNC’s budgeted amount. This may be explained by the following 
factors: 
• In the last decades, Iran has had an unstable economy under serious international sanctions. 
Generally, economic insecurity and high inflation rates encourage an attitude of maximising short-
term benefits and non-cooperative behaviour in water management (Madani and Dinar, 2012), 
and Iran has not been an exception. Due to sanctions and the global reduction in oil prices, the 
national economy faces financial problems. As all activities of the ULRNC are funded by the 
government, the country’s economic problems have affected the actual budget allocation for 
implementation of the restoration programme and have caused delays of some projects. 
• The regional implementation agencies of ministries are not held sufficiently accountable by their 
ministers with regard to spending, which may explain why funds have been diverted to projects 
other than lake restoration. In practice, therefore, even less than 30 percent of the amount 
allocated for the lake’s restoration is actually spent for that purpose. 
Dilemma of (de)centralisation: The Iranian government has a top-down central planning and 
policymaking structure which is located in Tehran. The advantage of such a centralised approach, within 
which the ULRNC functions, is that the water system can be dealt with holistically and policies can be 
developed at the basin scale. This centralised system, however, sometimes has insufficient knowledge of 
the local context in which programmes need to be implemented. Local actors – without a full 
understanding of national plans and policies – interpret the plans and then adjust them to local 
circumstances, which risks completely changing the objectives of the national policies. For example, in 
order to reduce water consumption in the agricultural sector, the ULRP has asked the regional 
implementation agency of the Ministry of Agriculture to change the pattern of sugar beet production 
from spawn (growing from seed) to planting (transplanting seedlings) in the Urmia Basin, especially in 
West Azerbaijan province. Accordingly, the regional implementation agencies of the Ministry of 
Agriculture received funds from the ULRP to produce and distribute sugar beet seedlings among West 
Azerbaijan farmers who for various reasons did not buy them, while the farmers in other provinces such 
as Kurdistan and East Azerbaijan were eager to do so. The agency thus distributed the seedlings among 
the latter, and some farmers began to plant sugar beets for the first time. Contrary to the objective of 
reducing water use, the implementation of the plan in the end resulted in an increase in sugar beet 
production and thus increased water usage. 
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Time and institutional stability: Huitema and Meijerink (2014) also observed that watershed 
organisations are not always given sufficient time to prove their effectiveness. In many countries, changes 
in political leadership often result in reform of water management organisations – a phenomenon also 
observed throughout the history of Iranian water resources management (Madani, 2014). One aspect of 
this is the transfer and shifting of local managers, which slows implementation of programmes. Urmia 
Lake restoration is a race against time, and in Iran there is a risk that a newly elected government may 
deprioritise restoration work and decide to abolish the committee – a potential postponement of action 
that may result in the irreversible ecological death of the lake. 
In addition to the four factors identified by Huitema and Meijerink (2014), we identified some 
important contextual factors which affect the committee’s performance. 
Lobbies: Due to the existence of some strong lobbies in Iranian water governance, disbursement of 
government funds does not occur according to plan, and funds are diverted to other purposes which are 
often contradictory to the intentions of the restoration plan. As an example, 31 percent of the funds paid 
out for the construction of irrigation and drainage sub-networks has been spent on the development of 
agricultural areas (ULRP, 2018b). A strong lobby also presses for interbasin water transfer projects, even 
though experts advise against them. As an example, the transfer of water from the Caspian Sea to Urmia 
Lake was a project which was opposed by most experts for a number of reasons, including high cost, risk 
of transmitting invasive biological species, its violation of international conventions, risk to the Caspian 
Sea, risk of bringing oil pollution and heavy metals from the Caspian Sea to Urmia Lake, and the 
destruction that would occur along a route that would pass through forests, pastures and fields (ULRP, 
2014b). Despite these concerns, a feasibility study for this transfer was approved. 
Gap in public awareness: According to the respondents, most people living in the Urmia Basin are not 
aware of the negative impacts of their behaviour and do not understand the causes of the water crisis. 
Perhaps due to poor economic conditions they lack a long-term perspective. 
Short-term thinking of politicians: Because of the existing political instability and insecurity within the 
system, politicians and decision makers are more interested in populist development actions which 
produce immediate economic results, rather than long-term planning for the restoration of ecosystems. 
For example, a dam construction project can get funded through pressure on the water authorities by a 
regional parliamentary representative – a process which boosts the regional economy and popularises 
the representative, increasing his/her chances of re-election. Short-term economic benefits and political 
popularity take precedence over long-term environmental issues and ecosystem preservation (Madani, 
2014). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Iranian water managers started to implement IWRM in 2007, and have faced problems similar to those 
of other countries. Deterioration of water management in Iran has put the country at serious risk of water 
scarcity. Urmia Lake is an important example of this unfolding water crisis. 
Since 2013, the Iranian government has recognised the critical nature of Urmia Lake’s situation, and 
has made serious attempts at restoration, including the establishment of a national committee which 
organises at the basin level, and which has developed plans to restore Urmia Lake to its ecological level. 
Due to political commitment and the involvement of all relevant policy sectors at the beginning, the 
committee was able to slightly improve coordination of policy and planning. By the end of the 
stabilisation phase, the committee was also able to reduce the negative effects of the lake’s shrinkage. 
Although the committee has developed a restoration plan, its implementation is highly problematic. 
Regional implementation agencies are slow, bureaucratic and inefficient. Contrary to the intention of 
restoration plans, further agricultural development has taken place, thus increasing water demand, and 
no effective actions have been taken to change cultivation patterns. The committee has also proven itself 
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to be unable to control upstream water usage and water releases from dams. Local communities, which 
are crucial to reducing water consumption, are still weak. No plans have been developed yet for creating 
alternative jobs and employment in non-agricultural sectors. 
National policy objectives have proven to be incompatible with actual trends and problems, such as 
increased agricultural production, improper budget allocation, institutional instability, lack of 
accountability of governmental bodies and executive agencies, malicious lobbies, and lack of water 
awareness. 
Considering these factors, the authors make the following recommendations: 
• Pay more attention to the institutional interplay among organisations involved in the 
implementation of restorations plans, including ministerial implementation agencies in the 
provinces; 
• Make sure that provinces are accountable to either the committee or central ministries; 
• Build and enhance the capacity of rural communities and institutions; 
• Use local capabilities and NGOs’ power to improve monitoring of project implementation; 
• Search for new sources of funding for plan implementation, such as international environment 
funds or private sector support; 
• Pay more attention to soft solutions such as social projects than to hard solutions such as 
construction projects; 
• Build capacity among local farmers and focus more on the creation of alternative livelihoods; 
• Pay more attention to demand management, and develop more flexible supply management 
strategies (Shadkam, 2017). 
In sum, with the establishment of the ULRNC a new player has emerged. The committee is considered to 
be a pilot for reform of Iranian water management, directed specifically at the restoration of Urmia Lake 
– a critical situation which has been neglected in previous national water policies. The ULRNC is trying to 
build a new form of water governance by engaging old players in more sustainable management. Policy 
support was initially present, but in the longer run the committee does not have sufficient political 
support to achieve its objectives, as evidenced by the fact that the government is not able, or not willing, 
to control agricultural expansion. Due to the incompatibility of lake restoration and agricultural 
development at a policy level, and the inability of the committee to hold ministerial implementation 
agencies and provincial agencies accountable, the implementation of the newly developed restorations 
plans is problematic. If Urmia Lake is to be saved, the local communities need to make lifestyle and water 
use changes. The real challenge, therefore, is to put in place economically feasible alternatives to high 
water use agriculture – alternatives which, despite the ULRNC’s efforts, have yet to be developed. 
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